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I INTRODUCTION 
In his separate judgment in Waitakere City Council v. Lovelock' Thomas J sets out five 
factors generally promoted as favouring judicial restraint when considering the 
reasonableness of a decision of a public authority. In summary these are: 
(1) Responsibility for the decision has been vested in the authority by Parliament, for 
reasons including its status, experience, knowledge and/or expertise. 
(2) The decision-maker (in that case a local authority) may be (or be directly 
accountable to) a democratically elected person or body. 
(3) The extent of other forms of administrative control such as the Audit Office, 
Ombudsman and Official Information Act, the impact of the consultation 
obligation; statutory appeals, powers of inspection by monitoring bodies and the 
like. 
( 4) The fact that there is genuine scope for differing views on most policy issues:
2 
The issues are often complex and difficult. The means of obtaining economic efficiency, 
the achievement of policy or strategic goals in the most cost-effective way, provides but 
one example of an area where the Courts must be hesitant in assuming, much less 
asserting, authority to judge. " 
( 5) Thomas J' s fifth factor is " ... the possibility that overly indulgent judicial 
intervention will inhibit administrators' efficiency in the performance of their 
statutory responsibilities." 
Thomas J refers to this fifth factor as "possibly more figmentary". "Figment", according 
to the Concise Oxford (9th ed), is a thing invented or existing only in the imagination. 
His Honour was sceptical: 
Administrators will constantly be looking over their shoulders apprehensive at the prospect of 
judicial review. The constant threat of such proceedings will make them over-cautious or 
lethargic. Justice O'Connor of the United States Supreme Court has made this point with a short 
[ 1997) 2 NZLR 385, 413-4 [Waitakere City Council] 
Above nl, 414 
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and entertaining fable in "Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review in England and the United 
States" (1986) 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 643 at p.655 : 
"The centipede was happy, quite, 
unti I a toad in fun 
Said, ' Pray which leg goes after which?' 
This worked his mind to such a pitch, 
He lay distracted in a ditch, 
Considering how to run ." 
One would not willingly wish this fate upon administrators, but there is in fact little or no 
empirical evidence that judicial review has the effect of inhibiting administrative action. 
His Honour may be right. A survey of those current Cabinet Ministers with (just short of) 
five to eleven years' Ministerial experience were asked whether they perceived that it did. 
On a scale of 1 (being not at all) to 5 (definitely), four gave a score of 1, two of2 and one 
of 4.3 
The same Ministers were asked whether they perceived their effectiveness to be enhanced 
by the requirements of administrative law to act "reasonably, fairly and in accordance 
with the law". Two answered "definitely" (5), four rated their answer a 2 on the same 
scale and one said "not at all". 4 Whether judicial review by the High Court was influential 
on their decision-making processes (1 being little influence and 5 being significant 
influence) was controversial. Two gave a score of 5, one of 4, two of 3, one of 2 and one 
of l. 5 
This paper considers the nature of that influence on decision-making in today's central 
government context. Do the requirements of administrative law to act "fairly, reasonably 
and in accordance with the law", and the supervisory role of the Court in ensuring the 
requirements are met, promote or inhibit good decision-making? One expects 
administrative law values to reflect and reinforce principles of good government. These 
might include informed decision-making, public participation, openness, 
acknowledgement/consideration of the rights and interests of individuals and groups, 
fairness and mutual trust between government and governed. Particular cases involve 
determining the boundaries of the particular power. The Court ' s approach to that task, 
and to the task of determining fair process, can be as value-laden as an assessment of the 
Responses to Questionnaire - Appendix A [Appendix A] Question 9. 
Appendix A, Question 10 
Appendix A, Question I 2(a) 
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"reasonableness" of a decision. In many cases, the distinction cannot properly be made, 
as a decision outside the four comers of the statutory power is, in classic Wednesbury 
terms, unreasonable.6 
This paper first identifies the broad aims and objectives of administrative law and 
considers the political nature of the judicial role. It then considers how administrative law 
has responded to the challenges in the New Zealand context. A sketch of today's 
governmental environment is attempted and it ends by asking whether administrative law 
is contributing to good government in an effective way. 
II BROAD AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE 
First principles first. The rule of law is the cornerstone of both individual freedom and 
democracy. 1 It is the means by which the rights of individuals are protected from the 
exercise of governmental power. Where the source of law is a democractically elected 
legislature, it must be a requirement of democracy that the executive observe it. The 
exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction by an independent judiciary is at the heart of 
ensuring those who exercise public powers do so not only lawfully, but also reasonably 
and in accordance with fair procedures.8 
The concepts of reasonableness and fairness are laden with value judgements. The task of 
interpreting the statute can also permit or require an assessment of matters of policy, for 
which there can be several different approaches and outcomes. How does an independent 
judiciary approach its jurisdiction? One school of thought maintains that it is a fiction 
that the law is apolitical,9 that the role of the Court can be seen as a response to the social 
See the classic statement of Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. 
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] I KB 223 , 228-230 
For a clear and authoritative exposition on the basic concepts and principles of democracy, see 
David Beetham & Kevin Boyle Introducing Democracy (Polity Press/UNESCO, Cambridge, 
1995) 
A paraphrase of the general grounds for review formulated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil 
Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [ 1985] AC 374 (HL) 410-411 and the (then) Rt 
Hon Sir Robin Cooke in 'The Struggle for Simplicity in Administrative Law" in Michael Taggart 
(ed) Judicial Review in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects (A uckland, 1986) 1, 17 
See Carol Harlow "Back to Basics: Reinventing Administrative Law " ( 1997) PL 245 , 247 
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and political context of the time 10• There is ample extra and intra-judicial 
acknowledgement that administrative law, in particular, develops and changes according 
to current perceptions of what is required of the Courts. 11 Judges will apply administrative 
law principles to the changing needs, perceptions and expectations of the community. 
They will do what they consider to be right according to their views of constitutional 
propriety. There is inevitably a degree of judicial subjectivity and different Courts will 
take a different view of their role. What was described by the (then) Rt Hon Sir Robin 
Cooke as a "profound difference in approach to decisions of Ministers" between English 
and New Zealand Courts in cases such as Rowling v. Takara Properties Ltd11 and 
Petrocorp Exploration Ltd v. Minister of Energy13 was explained 1992 as a consequence 
of "... the spirit or the light in which the Judge sees his administrative law 
responsibility". 14 
There are several different descriptions of the nature of this judicial discretion which 
focus on the political nature of the judicial role. One approach is the "red light" and 
"green light" theories of judicial intervention15• Very broadly, red light theories are those 
which favour the traditional view that the rights of the individual are among the highest 
goods known to the politico-legal system and state power in its many manifestations is 
basically an intrusion upon those rights. It follows that in many cases the law should be 
interpreted in favour of the individual, with an essential function of the Courts being to 
restrict encroachments on private rights by being ever ready to show a red light to public 
decision-makers. 
In contrast, green light theories embody the proposition that the contra distinction 
between "individual rights" and "state power" is a false one, and that the concept of "state 
power" can be redefined as "the public interest". It follows from this that the conflict is 
redefined as a confrontation between narrow, sectional or individual interests on the one 
hand, and the public interest on the other. 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
See JAG Griffiths Judicial Politics Since 1920 (1993) for a very readable excursion through 
recent UK judicial political history. 
See, for example, Thames Valley Electric Power Board v. NZFP Pulp & Paper Ltd [1994] 2 
NZLR 641 , 653 per Cooke P; and below n 14 
[ 1989] AC 473 (PC); [ 1988] I NZLR 22 (CA) 
[1991] I NZLR641 (PC); [1991] I NZLR I (HC, CA) 
Rt Hon Sir Robin Cooke "Empowerment and accountability: the quest for administrative justice " 
Judicial Colloquium, Balliol College, Oxford, September 1992, 14 
See generally Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration ( 1984 ). 
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Historically, adherents of the green light perspective were more likely to acknowledge the 
integrity and legitimacy of the political process as an instrument of social regulation. 
However, as the focus of the political process turns to the enhancement of private rights 
by regulatory restraint and the freer functioning of the market, the same green light 
perspective may become more cautionary, seeking ways to intervene to promote and 
preserve what are seen as broadly fundamental rights and interests. 
In his June 1984 paper "The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarship"16, AC 
Hutchinson described the different approaches of the "conceptualists" as against the 
"ideologists". Conceptualists are described as those who see administrative law as a 
"corpus of doctrinal principles, which coalesce to form an effective, fair and objective 
restraint on State action". 11 At one end of the "conceptualist" range is the "classical" 
group headed, Hutchinson opines, by H W R Wade and J F Gamer, who fit judicial 
review into a very simple constitutional design. Parliament delegates power to 
administrative bodies. Those bodies are accountable through the political process for the 
substance and merits of their decisions and to the Courts against the misuse or abuse of 
that delegated power. Underpinning this, however, is the fundamental constitutional 
responsibility of the Courts to safeguard the reasonable interests of the individual. 18 
At the other, "more enlightened" end of conceptualist scholarship, Hutchinson places de 
Smith who, he observes, concedes that judicial review is "inevitably sporadic and 
peripheral". 19 Hutchinson observes also what he describes as an emerging "nee-classical" 
approach. This utilises the concept of rational decision-making to construct more 
substantive intervention but without the Courts entering the policy-making "maelstrom".20 
On one view, New Zealand administrative law can be seen as falling within this neo-
classical conceptualist camp for the past 10 years, with the debate over the search for a 
principled approach to review for unreasonableness continuing.21 
The alternative approach to defining administrative law is, says Hutchinson, that of the 
"ideologists", who insist that administrative law is in a state of conceptual disarray. But 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
AC Hutchinson "The Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law and Scholarship" ( 1985) 48 MLR 
293, 318-322 
Above nl6, 318 
Above n 16, 319, referring to J F Garner Administrative Law (5th ed 1979) 20. 
Above n 16, 319, referring to de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action ( 4th ed 1980) 1. 
Above n16, 321. 
For example Waitakere above n 1, per Thomas J 
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beneath this "conceptual chaos" is a "disturbing ideological coherence" - judges are 
concerned to protect and preserve the status quo. Hutchinson cites by way of example 
Professor JAG Griffiths22 • Hutchinson himself appears to agree: 
The law is like a dog on a long leash . . . . [J]t has considerable range of movement. It can wander 
from the chosen path and cause considerable damage and frustration. " 
But, says Hutchinson, " ... it will ultimely follow the lead of its political master". 23 
Finally, one should refer to the debate between, roughly speaking, the two "poles on a 
continuum". 24 These are the democratic positivists (Parliament is sole source of law 
deriving its legitimacy from the will of the people) and the liberal anti-positivists Gudges 
enforce common law values which give effect to the will of the people - common law 
values are identified with the rights and liberties of the individual). Somewhere along the 
continuum the judiciary must supervise the exercise of public powers in the public 
interest by those elected representatives of the people. 
III THE NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT: THE COURT RESPONDS 
A The development of the duty to explain decisions 
The last 30 years have seen massive change in the process of government and the nature 
of the exercise of public power in New Zealand. 
The 1960s were marked by substantial investment in infrastructure by the Holyoake 
government, particularly dams, roads, schools and hospitals. The Vietnam war dominated 
the headlines and election campaigns were stormy. Television was a new and 
increasingly powerful medium. The level of information received by the electorate 
increased. 
22 
23 
24 
Above nl6 , 321 
Above nl6, 297. 
David Dyzenhaus "The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy" in Michael 
Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997) 279-80 
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The electoral choices in 1972 and 1975 were unequivocal. First, a landslide to Labour 
and then to National provided a sense of effective electoral accountability and 
consequently a clear mandate to the elected government to carry out their policies. These 
were the subject of quite explicit pre-election manifestos. There was no real question of 
new governments acting against manifesto commitments. 
Deference to Ministerial decision-making by the Courts in this context can be noted in 
cases such as Shand v. Minister .of Railways25 • In general terms, the Courts gave broad 
effect to privative clauses, permitting a reasonable range of errors withinjurisdiction.26 
However, the policies of the 1970s, and in particular those under the government of Sir 
Robert Muldoon, amounted in essence to highly interventionist, autocratic executive rule. 
This possibly created an element of disquiet about the effectiveness of the orthodox 
accountabilities of government to the people. We can observe the pendulum swinging in 
the mid 1970s to a closer look at the content of Ministerial decisions. 21 In Fiord/and 
Venison Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries28 a bench of three (all later to become 
consecutive Presidents of the Court) overturned the decision of the High Court deferring 
to the Minister on the matter of whether an issue of the licence to a game packing house 
would have a "significant detrimental effect on the economic operation of any game 
establishment or the stability of the game industry as a whole"29 • The Court of Appeal 
emphasised the need for the Court to be fully informed as to the facts and issues as they 
presented themselves at the time to the decision-maker. The "uninformative and brief' 
affidavit from the Director of the Meat Division did not provide the reasons for the 
decision. The Minister's reasons were the subject of inference by the Court, which then 
applied a finding of irrelevancy to them, resulting in invalidity. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
[1970] NZLR 615 (CA) 
Allorney-General v. Car Hau!aways (NZ) Ltd [ 1974] 2 NZLR 331 (CA), overturning the 
judgment of Cooke J who quashed the decision of the Transport Licensing Appeal Authority for 
error on the face of the record. 
See, for example, Van Gorkom v. Allorney-General (1978] 2 NZLR 387 (CA), this time 
upholding the judgment of Cooke J declaring general conditions relating to removal expenses of 
married women teachers to be invalid. 
[ 1978] 2 NZLR 341 (CA) 
Above n28, 353 per Richardson J 
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This call for transparency and openness with the Court was a continuing theme 
throughout the next decade. In CREEDNZ v. Governor-General3° the Court of Appeal 
was prepared to draw inferences favourable to the Crown from press clippings and the 
like. This was in the context of the significant policy decision to fast track the Aramoana 
aluminium smelter. However the Court, in particular Richardson J, was very critical of 
the lack of openness on the Crown' s part. The message was sharper still seven years later 
in New Zealand Fishing Industry Association v. Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries11 • 
In that case, decided in the climate of massive social change and dislocation, a Court of 
five noted the risk that adverse inferences might be drawn in the absence of an 
explanatory affidavit from the Minister. Without actually reversing the evidential onus, 
the possibility of an interventionist change to the rules was raised and the risks to the 
executive made plain. The Court emphasised that, while it was not for the courts to 
trespass into the "legitimate policy sphere of Ministers, the constitutional corollary should 
be Ministerial candour with the Courts about their policy"32 • Thus, in a style typical of the 
Court of Appeal under the presidency of Sir Robin Cooke, the executive was 
"encouraged" to provide a more open and reasoned response to challenges to its decisions. 
B Social dislocation - judicial interventions 
Over the period between CREEDNZ and NZFIA, New Zealand moved from the highly 
regulated, interventionist style of executive autocracy epitomised by the Muldoon era, to 
the rapid downsizing of government and a market-regulated economy prevalent since the 
mid 1980s under the Labour Lange government. 
In a fascinating essay, particularly in light of recent political developments under the new 
MMP electoral system, Richard Mulgan opines that New Zealanders in 1993 faced a 
"crisis of democratic legitimacy"33 • Successive governments, though granted extensive 
JO 
31 
32 
33 
[1981] I NZLR 172 (CA) [CREEDNZJ 
[ I 988] I NZLR 544 (CA) [NZFJA] 
Above n31 
Richard Mulgan "The Westminster System and the Erosion of Democratic Legitimacy" in B D 
Gray & RB McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy, Checking the Balance (Brookers Ltd, 
Wellington, 1995) 265 
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powers under New Zealand's extreme version of the Westminster system (unicameral, 
non-federal system of parliamentary government, first-past-the-post electoral system, 
single party government), could be made democratically accountable by well-established 
values and conventions which directed the use of executive power towards purposes set 
by the voting public. He observes that, since the defeat of the Muldoon government in 
1984, these values and conventions have been severely shaken:34 
The process of economic and state sector restructuring involved a wholesale attack on the 
ideology of democratic populism and pragmatism and on the conventions of party accountability 
which had been sustained by this ideology. 
Most of the restructuring carried out by successive governments was not part of either 
party's policy and did not have the consent of the voter. In Labour's case, Mulgan 
observes:35 
... the general programme of financial deregulation was unexpected and took party supporters and 
voters by surprise. For instance, the floating of the New Zealand dollar, the opening up of banking 
and financial markets, the ending of farm subsidies, the introduction of goods and services tax -
none of these had been mentioned before the election. 
The same period witnessed the divisions of the 1981 Springbok rugby tour to New 
Zealand, and the quite remarkable (for the time) intervention of the Court to effectively 
stop the 1985 tour. 36 This in circumstances where Parliament had earlier passed a 
resolution strongly urging that the invitation be rejected in the public interest, but 
conceding that the decision was a private one for the Union alone. In extending to the 
Union the degree of care imposed by the Courts on public bodies exercising public 
powers, Casey J was mindful of Cooke J's earlier warning in Stininato v. Auckland 
Boxing Association Jnc11: 
... concern for the development of administrative law as an effective and realistic branch of justice 
must imply that the discretionary remedies should not be granted lightly. After all, progress is not 
synonymous with givingjudgment for plaintiffs. 
It was certainly a case for its time. The apartheid policies have gone, Nelson Mendela is 
President of South Africa, the Springboks hold the rugby world cup, and counsel for Mr 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Above n33 , 272 
Above n33, 274 
Finnegan v. New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [1985] 2 NZLR 139 (HC, CA), and (No.2) 
181 (HC) [Finnegan] 
[ 1978] I NZLR 29, referred to by Casey J in Finnegan above n36, 186 
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Finnegan now exert their influence from the benches of the High Court and Court of 
Appeal. The lines between public and private power, however, remain purposefully 
blurred. In today's environment, Rule 626(1)(d) of the High Court Rules would assist Mr 
Finnegan with jurisdiction, while section 18 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(protecting the right to freedom of movement) could present a problem. 
The request for candour ("or else") by the Court of Appeal in NZFIA 38 was accepted by 
the executive and set the scene for the broad evidential approach that is now adopted; the 
provision of reasonably full and frank affidavits on behalf of decision-makers explaining 
the relevant aspects of the decisions in issue, and an immunity from cross-examination on 
those affidavits except in exceptional circumstances, where it could be said to be 
necessary in the interests of a just determination of the issues39 • 
I suggest that this move towards a procedural duty to explain can be seen as the result of 
concern by the Courts that the supervisory jurisdiction be exercised in an informed 
manner. The Courts hesitated to defer to a decision-maker, even in matters involving 
"policy" without the comfort of persuasion that the "policy" was sound. Perhaps this was 
a response to the less-consensual nature of government. Perhaps too the courts were 
mindful of the reality that their decisions on review afford legitimacy to the decisions of 
government; that to a significant extent they do protect and preserve the status quo. Trite 
to say that the rule of law enables, rather than inhibits, lawful government. The Court 
must exercise its jurisdiction in the context of increasingly complex decisions, some far-
reaching and difficult to reverse (such as the corporatising and privatising of previously 
public assets), some creating significant dislocation (for example, changes to fishing 
quota, market rents for state houses and the tendering of services previously carried out by 
one group). 
The Court's response ensured decisions were clearly explained. It also provided the Court 
with an ability to exercise more influence. It was the provision of a clear exposition of 
the Minister's approach in Petrocorp Exploration Ltd v. Minister of Energy~0 that enabled 
38 
39 
40 
Above n.31 
This development can be traced through the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Minister of 
Energy v Petrocorp Exploration Ltd [ 1989] I NZLR 348 (CA), Attorney-General v Air New 
Zealand 4 PRNZ 1 (relating to former Ministers) and Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd v 
Pharmac [ 1997] 1 NZLR 650 (CA). 
[1991] I NZLR I (CA) 
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the majority in the Court of Appeal to observe that the Minister's expressed national 
interest motivation for granting a petroleum mining licence over part of the Waihapa 
discovery to the Crown, was not for "legitimate" matters such as retaining governmental 
control of a valuable oil resources in the face of a potential oil crisis, but for "essentially 
pecuniary" reasons (obtaining value for an unlicensed Crown-owned resource). On the 
other hand, the minority judge, Richardson J, accepted that the identification and 
determination of the national interest was for the Minister. He expressly acknowledged 
the limits to the democratic acceptability of judicial review, reflecting concerns about the 
constitutional and democratic implications of judicial involvement in wide issues of 
public policy and public interest' '. This deference to Ministerial policy was a theme of the 
Courts' decisions a decade earlier in CREEDNZ42 and Ashby v. Minister of lmmigration43 • 
The point was bluntly rammed home by the Privy Council, overturning the Court of 
Appeal in Petrocorp44 : 
Judicial review is a great weapon in the hands of the judges - but the judges must observe the 
constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon their exercise of this beneficent power. 
This is just as true in New Zealand as it is in the United Kingdom. 
C Judicial review and the position of Maori under the Treaty 
Over the period from the early fisheries challenges in 198645 to, perhaps, the highpoint in 
the judgment relating to the permitting of whale watching in Kaikoura in 199546 the Court 
of Appeal under the presidency of Sir Robin Cooke engaged in a delicate "balance of 
power" dance with the executive.47 
A new government, litigation wary, did not seek to test the Court of Appeal on the 
relevance of the recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal on Te Reo Maori in its 1986 
report to the tendering of radio frequencies under the Radio Communications Act 1989 in 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Above n40, 46 
CREEDNZ above n30 
[1981] I NZLR222 (CA) 
[1991] 1 NZLR 641 (PC), 656 
The history of the litigation is set out in Te Runanga O Muriwhenua Inc v. Attorney-General 
[ 1990] 2 NZLR 641 
Nga Tahu Maori Trust Board v. Director-General of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553 (CA) 
For an interesting discussion on the rise of judicial activism and return to orthodoxy, see Jane 
Kelsey Rolling Back the State (Bridget Williams Books Ltd, Wellington, 1993) 191-219 
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Attorney-General v. New Zealand Maori Council ("Radio Spectrum No. I ")48. The Crown 
conceded that the Minister would be obliged to take those matters into account, and did, 
in fact, do so49 • In receipt of that concession, the majority (Cooke P, Casey and Bisson JJ) 
went on to find that, because the Minister had not also considered the "imminent" 
recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal on Maori Broadcasting, compliance had not 
occurred. Interim relief was continued50 • The issue came back before the Court two 
months later.51 The relevant report had been released and considered by the Minister. The 
government determined to proceed with the tender process. The Court of three 
unanimously declined to further extend interim relief. This time the majority (Casey and 
Hardie Boys JJ) expressed reservations about whether the principles of the Treaty were 
necessarily relevant in areas of decision-making where there is no statutory provision 
requiring them to be taken into account. The pendulum seemed to be swinging - at least 
for one member of the Court. 
As Cooke P observed in the Fisheries Claim settlement case (Te Runanga O Wharekauri 
Rekohu Inc v. Attorney-Genera/)52 : 
The New Zealand judgments are part of a widespread international recognition that the rights of 
indigenous peoples are entitled to some effective protection and advancement. 
If one considers the aims and objectives of administrative law to be to prevent abuse of 
power and promote good decision-making, it is perhaps surprising that the vehicle of 
judicial review has been used to achieve this entitlement. 
Yet it is difficult to argue with the evidence of the impact of the process of judicial review 
on government decisions in circumstances where the assessment of the national interest 
by the executive was not on all fours with the Courts' assessment of the relative 
consideration to be afforded Maori interests in particular. 
Whether the result contributed to "good government" depends on your viewpoint. Many 
would say the Courts assisted the executive in finding a politically possible way to give 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
[1991] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) [Radio Spectrum No.l] 
Above n48, 144 
Above n48, 139 
Attorney-General v. New Zealand Maori Council (No.2) [1991] 2 NZLR 147 (CA) [Radio 
Spectrum No.2] 
[ 1993] 2 NZLR 30 I, 306 (CA) 
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necessary, and overdue, progress to Maori aspirations. Others see the Court as improperly 
engaging in social engineering. The "return to orthodoxy" could be seen as a retreat by 
the Court in the face of rising public disaffection, or alternatively, simply the achievement 
of the objective, for the moment. 
D Promoting fundamental human rights norms through judicial review 
Another clear example of the Cooke court "encouraging" good decision-making can be 
seen from the interim judgment in Tavita v. Minister of Immigration53 • The judgment is 
well known54• 
The Minister's decision declining to cancel a removal warrant against Mr Tavita was 
made in April 1991, shortly before Mr Tavita's marriage and the birth of his daughter. 
The Minister's affidavit was sworn in October 1993 and indicated that, even if the fact of 
Mr Tavita's domestic circumstances had been before him, his decision was not likely to 
have been any different because he would not have seen those circumstances as 
"exceptional" circumstances of a humanitarian nature. No mention was made of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 or the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1989. 
The submission of counsel for the Minister to the effect that the Minister was not obliged 
to take international instruments into account, was based on the wholly orthodox position 
that, in the absence of implementing legislation, treaties do not impose duties or confer 
rights. 55 He might equally have argued that the Minister's views on "exceptional" 
circumstances were not inconsistent with the international commitments of the 
government, and the Minister's views could be seen as taking into account, for example, 
the impact of the decision on the child. 
53 
54 
55 
[ 1994) 2 NZLR 257 [Tavita] (CA) 
For a discussion of Tavita and its influence see Melissa Poole "The Use and Abuse of 
[ntemational Instruments" in Public Law Update on Administrative Law and Judicial Review 
(NZLS lntensive, September 1998) 
See, for example, New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Association Inc v. Attorney-General 3 NZLR 
269 (CA) 
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The Court reported the "burden of the argument" as being that the Minister was "entitled 
to ignore the international instruments", and described it as "unattractive". It 
acknowledged that it was "neither necessary nor desirable" to decide whether the law 
should be developed, but spelt out the potential risks of forcing the Court to determine 
whether the executive are "free to ignore" international human rights norms or 
obligations.56 
The Minister was given the opportunity of reconsideration, and the appeal was adjourned 
sine die. As a consequence, the Immigration Service amended its guidelines to direct 
officers dealing with removal orders to take the relevant international instruments into 
account, and balance the competing considerations which arise in the particular case. 
Particular examples are given.57 
This constructive response by government has meant the Court has not been called upon 
to decide the issue (as formulated by the Court) of whether the executive is free to ignore 
international human rights norms or obligations. One might expect that an argument is 
unlikely to be presented by the Crown in those terms. Subsequent cases such as Lawson 
v. Housing New Zealand58, Puli 'uvea v. Removal Review Authority59 and Rajan v. Minister 
of Immigration60 proceeded on the basis that, whatever the legal position, the Ministers or 
relevant decision-makers had in fact taken into account the purport of relevant 
international obligations. 
E Ensuring openness: Public Interest Immunity constrained 
As mentioned above, the duty to explain facilitates a closer scrutiny of the quality of 
decisions. The courts have also ensured that Ministers are not able to hide their true 
motives and processes behind the shelter of public interest immunity, were they so 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Tavita, above n53 , 266 
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minded. It is, of course, wrong to speak of public interest immunity as if it were a 
"privilege" of the Crown. An objection to production on the basis of the public interest is 
the discharge of a duty which arises whether or not a document assists or damages the 
Crown's case. 6 1 
A certificate of the Minister claiming public interest immunity will be given due respect 
by the Courts, but they will be prepared to order production for the purposes of inspection 
to determine whether the claim is properly made. Cooke J observed in Brightwell v. 
ACC62; that " ... a Ministerial objection is never to be set aside lightly". However, the 
move towards more open government is persuasive in the trend towards greater 
disclosure63 • 
In any event, the Court is likely to confirm for itself the validity of the claim. A recent 
judgment64 concerned a ministerial certificate signed by the Prime Minister objecting to 
production of some 70 documents held by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. 
She certified that production would be likely to prejudice New Zealand ' s defence and 
security. The objections included those documents of greatest relevance to the 
proceeding, which related to the interpretation of an interception warrant issued by the 
SIS. The Court found it had difficulty placing the Prime Minister' s assessment in a 
meaningful context, and proposed to inspect the documents itself before finally ruling on 
the immunity claim. So again, the theme is close scrutiny and effective checking. 
IV REFORMED GOVERNMENT: THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE 1990s 
A The new public management 
A key reform to influence government decision-making processes in the early 1980s was 
the move to more open government effected by the Official Information Act 1982. The 
6 1 
62 
63 
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See Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade [ 1983] 2 AC 394, 446 per Lord Scarman (HL) 
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core principle of the Act is that official information is to made available unless it falls 
within a legislated exception, or the public interest in availability is outweighed by some 
particular "good reason for withholding" information as provided in the Act. 65 An 
enhanced ability to access personal information was provided,66 as was a right to a review 
by the Ombudsman of decisions to withhold information67 • A duty on decision-makers to 
give reasons for decisions upon request was provided by section 23. A duty to comply 
within particular timeframes was introduced by amendment in 1989. 
The State Sector restructuring of the mid 1980s included the enactment of the State-
Owned Enterprises Act 1986 which exposed former Government trading departments to a 
more commercial style of operation under the Companies Act regime, responsible to a 
Board of Directors. Clear lines of reporting and accountability were established, 
including annual reporting by shareholding Ministers to Parliament, subjection to audit 
by the Auditor General and select committee scrutiny. 
In the core public sector, the State Sector Act 1988 and Public Finance Act 1989 were the 
cornerstones of the new relationships between Ministers and their advisers and agencies. 
Important, too, was the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989. According to the long 
title, it aimed: 
.... to provide, while continuing to recognise the Crown's right to determine economic policy, for 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, as the central bank, to be responsible for formulating and 
implementing monetary policy designed to promote stability of the general level of prices. 
Thus in the space of five short years, New Zealand moved from the piecemeal hyper-
interventions of the executive by way of regulated wages and price freezes,68 to delegated 
independent management by a central bank pursuant to clear and published policies. The 
cummulative impact of these reforms, cemented further by the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
1994, was to increase significantly the fiscal accountabilities of Government while 
creating a high level of transparency. 
65 
66 
67 
68 
Official Information Act 1982, Part I 
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There is an increasing emphasis on the "efficient and effective achievement of outputs" by 
Government entities. Outputs are specified in the purchase agreement negotiated 
between the Minister and the Department. Since the 1993/94 year purchase agreements 
have been incorporated into the performance agreements of all CEOs. These principles 
are currently being extended to underlying Departmental purchase agreements with 
Crown entities and other third parties from which Government is purchasing "outputs". 
Purchase agreements emphasise results, leaving the body responsible for finding the most 
efficient means of achieving them. Limited resources and the consequent need to set 
priorities is the driver behind these measures. 
Outputs are the "basic building block of Government decision-making and accountability 
mechanisms". 69 Purchase agreements defining the outputs assist Ministers in more 
effective government in a number of ways. They provide more clarity of choice between 
options which best conform to government strategy and represent (in the Minister's 
opinion) best value for money, They allow Ministers to agree to appropriate cost, 
quantity and quality measures and standards for desired outputs. Ministers can determine 
the preferred supplier where there are alternative suppliers, assess the risks and 
obligations associated with delivery, record and change decisions, and verify output 
delivery, and hold the supplier accountable for delivery of the specified output. 
The public has access to the purchase agreements or statements of intent of all Crown-
owned entities and core government agencies. They can see what services are to be 
provided by these agencies, how much it is expected those services will cost, and how the 
agency's performance in delivering those services will be assessed. The performance of 
the agencies against those objectives can be, and is, monitored via the Public Finance Act 
process. The objectives themselves can be challenged. Thus we live in an age where 
information about government processes has never been more available to those energetic 
enough to trawl their way through it. 
Social and environmental reforms have also been dramatic. The powers of the Waitangi 
Tribunal, established by the Labour Government in 1975 to inquire into grievances of 
Maori, were increased in 1985 to include investigation of grievances back to the signing 
of the Treaty in 1840. This Parliamentary recognition that the Executive would receive 
69 That statement and the information which follows is taken from the Purchase Agreement 
Guidelines, New Zealand Treasury, Wellington, 1995. 
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the results of these inquiries and consider recommendations made by the Tribunal aimed 
at settling long-standing grievances, set the scene for the dramatic impact of the decisions 
of the Court of Appeal on subsequent restructuring of state owned assets. 10 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 affirmed New Zealand's commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights and expressed the objective of 
promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand.11 This was another 
skeleton framework erected by Parliament and brought to life, as such rights legislation 
inevitably must be, by the Courts. 
The Human Rights Act 1993 consolidated various rights legislation and gave promise to 
the future aspirations of a right based society. In the environmental area the Resource 
Management Act 1990 reconstructed planning law in New Zealand. A comprehensive and 
world-leading fisheries management regime was enacted in 198612 • Other significant 
legislative measures designed to protect the environment include the Forests Amendment 
Act 1993 and the Hazardous Substance and Noxious Organisms Act 1996. 
Electoral reform has also been significant. The introduction of a mixed-member form of 
proportional representation in 1996 has imposed a more formal constitutional requirement 
on governments to negotiate policies across party lines, rather than primarily within caucus. 
This is likely to result in more politically popular, and therefore electorally acceptable, 
policies than might otherwise have been the case under the former system of more 
centralised executive power. 
One can readily see that there are significant operational requirements, checks and 
balances on today's Public Service. Apart from the legislative framework, there are the 
general principles in the Public Service Code of Conduct,73 the requirements of the 
Cabinet Office Manual and various published guidelines on public service ethics. 
Department performance is subject to Audit Office and select committee scrutiny. The 
70 
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Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 
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demonstrable public interest in neutrality, professionalism and accountability 1s at the 
forefront ofrecruitment and training in the Public Service.74 
As one very experienced former Chief Executive has said of government in the 1970s75 : 
Decisions, including those which influenced people's careers, were often made in secret. While 
judicial review was available in concept, it was rarely availed of in practice. I was once, as 
Director of Prices and Stabilisation, responsible for that draconian regulatory tool, the Economic 
Stabilisation Act, under which governments without parliamentary scrutiny, could bring down 
regulations which controlled major drivers of the economy, eg the wages and prices freeze of the 
Muldoon era. Fortunately that statute has now been abolished. In its place we have the Reserve 
Bank Act and the Fiscal Responsibility Act which, in addition to their substantive provisions are 
renowned for their transparency. Indeed transparency, at least in the core state sector is now part 
of our environment. It is part of the democratic process and certainly is an integral part of our 
accountability . . . I believe firmly that the state sector reforms have given much stronger 
incentives for focused performance, for measurement of efficiencies, and for comparative 
judgrnents about the way in which departments contribute to a government' s strategies. 
Today's social and economic environment means that Government places considerable 
emphasis on the need to do more, better, in the context of tight constraints on public 
spending. 
So on the one hand, we have a significant emphasis on setting priorities and achieving 
results within limited budgets. The focus in this regard is firmly on results. When the 
government shifted from budgeting for inputs to budgeting for outputs, it ostensibly freed 
price from cost, so that the amount it pays no longer explicitly covers the cost of the 
inputs (for example legal advice, consultation processes) needed to produce the outputs. 76 
At the same time, society less directly but as emphatically also seeks the maximum value 
for the taxpayer dollar. Business and wider economic imperatives are calling for closer 
attention to the compliance costs of legislative and policy measures and a closer 
examination of the appropriateness and costs of government interventions before their 
implementation. 
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The incentives within government to intervene and regulate is the subject of current 
debate and review. See, for example, Cabinet agreement in December last year to a 
regulatory "six pack" of measures. In summary, measures included: 
(1) A Code of Good Regulatory Practice based on principles of effectiveness, 
efficiency, equity, transparency and clarity. 
(2) A genenc policy development process to achieve the goals of the Good 
Regulatory Practice Code. 
(3) A requirement for Regulatory Impact Statements in all papers to Cabinet, to 
provide information on the total regulatory impact of the proposed measure 
including a statement of the net benefit of the proposal, which itself is to include 
the total regulatory costs (administrative, compliance and economic costs) and 
benefits (including non-quantifiable benefits) of the proposal, "and other possible 
options". 
( 4) Agreement in principle to a Regulatory Responsibility Act, analogous to the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act, to enhance the disciplines supporting quality 
regulatory management. An "Experts Group" has been established to consider 
this concept. 
(5) Reviews of selected legislation which business considers has significant cost 
impacts, to ensure that costs imposed by the legislation are minimised. 
Legislation selected for review includes: 
Building Act 1991 
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 
Privacy Act 1993 
Human Rights Act 1993; and 
Meat Act 1981, Dairy Industry Act 1952 and related legislation 
governing food safety. 
It was noted that the Resource Management Act 1990, Employment Contracts 
Act 1992, Holidays Act 1981 and Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
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Insurance Act 1992 were being considered by the Ministries responsible. Some 
of these reviews have made some progress. 
(6) A proposal to establish an independent Regulatory Task Force to look at existing 
regulation and ways of improving it. 77 
Although much of this is aimed at excessive or inefficient regulating, the cost of 
intervention necessarily includes the cost of the process of intervening - which will almost 
inevitably include some "big ticket" items such as consultation. 
B Consultation in the 1990s 
Consultation is central to almost all Government processes. This has been partly the 
result of a changing society which demands more involvement in decision-making for the 
decisions of Government to find acceptance with the community, the effectiveness of 
consultation as a way of best ensuring that decision-making processes are fair, lawful and 
reasonable, and the acknowledged need by Government to make informed decisions both 
as to the facts and consequences of particular course of action, and as to their acceptability 
to various sections of the community. 
Consultation operates on several levels. I use the term very broadly, to include that aspect 
of the duty to act fairly which requires decision-makers to have regard to the interests of 
individuals directly or particularly affected by a decision, and which will usually include 
giving them an adequate opportunity to answer any adverse material, or to state their 
views. 78 
77 
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Consequently, consultation requirements are imposed by a significant number of statutes 
and regulations, and effectively by the Courts whenever a person or entity's rights, 
interests and/or legitimate expectations are affected by a decision or action. 79 
Much has been said about the legal requirements of consultation, the elements of which 
are summarised on the basis of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Wellington 
International Airport v. Air New Zealand6° as follows: 
(1) The consultor must provide the consulted with reasonable information. 
(2) The consultor must give the consulted a reasonable opportunity to state their 
views. 
(3) The consultor must consider the consulted's views with an open mind before 
making his/her decision. 
( 4) The consultor may act if the consulted do not fully avail themselves of the 
opportunity for consultation. 
The role of consultation in efficient and effective fisheries management 
The regulation of fishing in the interests of sustainable management of the resource is one 
key area where Government significantly interferes with commercial, recreational 
environmental and Maori interests. Consultation on decisions affecting these interests is a 
hallmark of the 1983 and 1996 legislations and this is plainly appropriate given the 
significant impact of policy decisions, such as the level of catch for various species and 
areas, on those affected. 
At the same time, a cost recovery regime was introduced in 1994 whereby a share of the 
costs incurred by Government in managing the commercial fisheries (including the costs 
of consulting with the industry in the delivery of policy advice) is recovered from the 
79 
80 
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industry8 1• The intention is that the costs incurred as a result of the existence of the 
commercial industry (that is, "avoidable costs") shall be recovered from the commercial 
sector. 
Following the setting of levies, the New Zealand Fishing Industry Association filed 
proceedings seeking judicial review of the regime and a large number of fishers refused to 
pay their 1996/97 levy. Consequently, in March 1997 the Primary Production Select 
Committee announced an inquiry into the Government's cost recovery regime and the 
proceedings were withdrawn. 
The 1997 /98 contribution by the industry towards the cost of providing fisheries 
management and research services was $37 million. The draft budgets made available for 
the 1998/99 financial year in March of this year ( upon which consultation proceeded) 
would represent an increase to industry levies of $11 million, or 33 per cent82 • A 
significant part of that projected cost was said to be the implementation of the 1996 
Fisheries Act, a staged process over four to five years. Each part of the Act is intended to 
come into effect by way of Order in Council. Regulations are also intended to be phased 
in. The Ministry advised that "consultation with those likely to be affected .. . will be a key 
part of the development process. 11 83 The one-off costs of implementation are estimated at 
about $32 million, with increased ongoing Ministry expenses over the next 4 or 5 years of 
$4 million annually.84 This is of total industry export receipts for 1997 of around $1.2 
billion. 
Following the completion of the consultation process, the Minister recently announced the 
1998/99 levies as $32.4 million, "excluding transaction charges of approximately $2 
million"85 • He noted the comparative cost to the taxpayer of $20.2 million, bringing the 
total cost of fisheries management and related conservation services to $54.6 million. 
The reduction from the March draft budget appears from the press release to be partly as a 
result of a decision by the Minister not to include "under and over recoveries" from 
previous years, particularly given their impact on small fishers. We see then a clear 
example of the beneficial results of consultation for the industry. This is consistent with 
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the generally quite positive responses to questions relating to the effectiveness of 
consultation in the survey of Ministers and Chief Executives.86 
Interesting also is the Minister's expressed disappointment that he could not lawfully 
implement a change to the hourly charging regime for a range of marine farming and 
aquaculture-related transactions "due to the wording in the Fisheries Act 1996". This 
highlights a well-understood problem with highly prescriptive legislation. It is perhaps 
surprising that, in an environment where amending legislation has become a very difficult 
process ( due to pressure on sitting hours and the need to secure agreement across party 
lines in circumstances where consensus does not generally attract media attention or 
distinguish a party to the electorate), Parliament continues to carefully proscribe its 
delegated powers.87 It is encouraging to note, however, that the Minister was both mindful 
and respectful of the limits of his powers. The responses to questions 3 and 4 of the 
survey are apposite. 88 
As a result of concerns about the impact of costs on the viability of the industry, the 
Minister in March announced he was undertaking an independent review of the policy 
settings in the 1996 Act, "focusing on simplifying its operation, efficient resource use and 
if possible reducing compliance costs on stakeholders". The review, "Fishing for the 
Future" has just been released. 89 It notes that the current basis for allocating costs 
between the government (taxpayer) and industry differed markedly in fishing from that of 
other primary production sectors. It recommended amending the 1996 Act to provide a 
simpler, less costly regime, and cost recovery based on efficiency, where those groups that 
benefit from using the fisheries pay for the supporting services, rather than the present 
"avoidable cost" principle. 
The operation of the cost recovery regime under the Fisheries legislation is the best 
example I have seen of an analysis that comes close to weighing of the costs and benefits 
of consultation as a precursor to government intervention. The commercial fishing 
86 
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industry is one group which, because it pays for a share of the costs of the process, has a 
significant incentive to ensure the process is as efficient as possible. However, it does not 
control the process, and other interest groups (such as recreational fishers and 
environmental interests) do not suffer the san1e incentives. The review's suggestions may 
rectify that imbalance. 
V IS JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE 1990s PROMOTING GOOD 
ADMINISTRATION? 
We have seen how successive governments have responded to the "encouragement" of the 
Courts. Quality decision-making is a goal of central government and there are now very 
structured institutions within central government to ensure that this is achieved. 
At the same time, the demands for efficient and retrained government spending puts 
pressure on the system to ensure a balance is achieved. Perhaps the nature of decision-
making and an assessment of the influence of the Court in promoting good administration 
can be considered by reference to the duty to give reasons under the Official Information 
Act and two recent cases; Lawson v. Housing New Zealancf0 and the review of Pharmac's 
Rulide decision91• 
A Official Information Act duty to explain 
Has the Courts' demand for reasoned explanations had a salutary effect on Ministerial 
decision makers, knowing they might subsequently be required to explain their position to 
a Judge? One might debate that. Ministers depend on the public understanding and 
accepting their decisions if they are to retain their influence. Note too that decision-
makers have been under a statutory obligation to give reasons for most of their decisions 
to persons who are directly affected by them, on request, since the inception of the 
Official Information Act in 1982.92 
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The written statement required by section 23(1) must include the findings on material 
issues of fact, a reference to the information on which the findings are based, and the 
reasons for the particular decision or recommendation. The Minister's recommendation 
in the NZFIA case related to the varying of resource rentals paid by commercial 
fishermen93 • It would have qualified for a statement of reasons under the s.23 duty had an 
affected member of the industry requested one. That statement would have either 
explicitly answered the question exercising the Court, that is, did the Minister give 
separate consideration to actual net returns to commercial fishermen? The lack of any 
mention of the matter in the statement of reasons, I suggest, would have raised a clear 
inference that the Minister had not turned his mind to the point. 
It must be accepted that a requirement to give reasons for a decision will encourage 
considered decision making and discourage arbitrary or unprincipled decisions. Thus the 
process provides an effective safeguard to the exercise of power in an arbitrary or 
irrational fashion. In this sense, however, the Courts are effectively duplicating an 
incentive acknowledged and affirmed by Parliament in 1982. 
B Lawson v. Housing New Zealand 
The challenge by Mrs Lawson to the increase in her rent by her landlord, Housing New 
Zealand, and the policy directions to Housing New Zealand by its shareholding Ministers, 
necessarily lead the Court into an area of "high policy"94• At the heart of the issues were 
the decisions in the 1991 "Mother of all budgets" to better target housing assistance by 
adjusting the existing regime of inequitable direct provision of low cost housing to a few, 
and spread housing assistance more fairly across the public and private rental and 
mortgage sector for those on low incomes.95 
The complex nature of the policy development and change process over a 5 year period 
meant it was only possible to give the Court a summary of that process, albeit that 
"summary" involved the provision of several eastlight folders of cabinet papers and 
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affidavits from consecutive Ministers. Was that necessary? The shareholding Ministers 
faced allegations which included failure to have regard to relevant international 
obligations relating to housing and shelter when setting the Crown's social objectives for 
Housing New Zealand; unreasonableness; breach of the right to life under s.8 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and breach of Mrs Lawson's legitimate expectations. 
Candour as to the policy required a fully reasoned explanation. This was provided. It 
may have had the effect of persuading the Court that the decisions and actions of the 
shareholding Ministers were of a kind that involved matters of policy which the Court 
was not well placed to evaluate. It also may have provided a level of comfort about the 
process and "quality" of decisions which can carry a public perception of inherent 
unfairness. In any event, the Court found the matters were not in the circumstances 
susceptible to judicial review. 
This view was arrived at only after a careful consideration by the Court of the surrounding 
circumstances, including the policy development process, and without concern to the fast 
fading (now invisible) distinctions between review of statutory and non-statutory powers. 
In any event, in case it was wrong about justiciability, the Court went on to consider the 
merits of the claims against both Housing New Zealand and the shareholding Ministers. 
Without deciding whether or not the Ministers were legally obliged to have regard to the 
relevant international instruments, Williams J found that the aims of those instruments 
were comparable with the principles which had underpinned the housing reforms. Thus 
the Ministers did properly inform their decision making process and make proper efforts 
to balance the various competing factors. Again, bearing in mind the dicta of Cooke P in 
Tavita v. Minister of lmmigration96, query whether the Court would have been prepared to 
infer this in the absence of full disclosure by the Ministers. 
Lawson demonstrated that good decision-making processes were in place. Cabinet 
received significant quantitative and qualitative material, including policy advice from 
private and public sector sources. There was a high level of consultation, adequate 
monitoring and consequent adjustment of policies over time and, indeed, evidence of a 
degree of political compromise. 
96 Tavita, above n53 , 266 
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C Judicial review and efficient decision-making: the Rulide case 
The decisions of the Court of Appeal and Privy Council in the review of Pharmac' s rulide 
decision (in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited v. Rousell Uclaf Australia Pty 
Ltd and Rousell Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd & Rousell NZ Ltd v. Pharmaceutical 
Management Ltd 97 make an interesting study of the balancing of administrative law 
requirements and the need for efficient decision-making. The proceedings related to the 
decision of the pharmaceutical purchasing agency (Pharmac) to reduce the subsidy 
payment made by Regional Health Authorities for tablets, an antibiotic produced by 
Rousell. The proceedings do not relate to Ministerial decisions. However, they concern 
very significant decisions made in the public interest which, prior to the health reforms of 
1993, were made by the Minister.98 
Under Pharmac's published Operating Policies and Procedures (OPPs), which had been 
the subject of substantial consultation with the pharmaceutical industry, Pharmac applies 
a methodology known as reference pricing whereby pharmaceuticals are classified into 
different therapeutic groups and sub-groups. All pharmaceuticals in a given sub-group 
are subsidised at the level of the lowest priced pharmaceutical in that sub-group. A sub-
group is defined as a set of pharmaceuticals which produce the same or similar 
therapeutic effect in treating the same or similar conditions. 
Until December 1995 there had been different levels of subsidy for a group of 
pharmaceuticals known as erythromycins on the one hand and for and another 
pham1aceutical Klacid on the other. In December 1995, after an extensive review over a 
period of about two years, involving consultation with Rousell on five or six occasions, 
Pharmac decided to create a new sub-group consisting of the erythromycins and . The 
result was that the level of subsidy for was to be fixed at the (lower) subsidy level for the 
cheapest of the erythromycins. The subsidy for was accordingly halved. In announcing 
its decision, Pharmac indicated that consideration of Klacid's place in the therapeutic 
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group was ongoing and would be "reported on in the near future". The higher subsidy 
level remained for Klacid. 
The legislative context was obviously critical. The Health and Disability Services Act 
1993 was recognised as emphasising obtaining maximum value for money in the delivery 
of health services of an appropriate standard. The purpose of the Act, as stated in s.4, is 
to reform the public funding and provision of health services and disability services in 
order to secure for the people of New Zealand: 
(ii) the best health; and 
(iii) the best care or support for those in need of those services . . . that is 
reasonably achievable within the amount of funding provided. 
The Court of Appeal split 4-1 in favour of Pharmac.99 In his dissenting judgment, Thomas 
J formulated the essential issue as 100 : 
... whether ... Pharmac is obliged to act evenhandedly as between companies manufacturing and 
selling pharmaceutical products in the same therapeutic sub-group, and consistently with its 
Operating Policies and Procedures, when reclassifying one or more product in that sub-group. 
The majority judgment of Richardson P, Henry, Blanchard and Tipping JJ, delivered by 
Blanchard J, found that, contrary to the decision in the High Court, there was adequate 
justification for Pharmac's decision to treat differently from Klacid. Reasons included 
the findings of fact that Klacid held a very small market share (1 % compared with 's 65%) 
and its manufacturer had never been prepared to supply the medicine at the subsidised 
rate. This meant that any change in the subsidy level by Pharmac would simply increase 
the part-charge to the purchaser. Thus the market impact on Rousell was perceived as 
likely to be slight. The greater risk was that other types of antibiotics might be favoured, 
In fact the Court also recognised that Pharmac's objective was to save money. That is 
their primary function and is consistent with the Act. The information they had was that 
substantial savings would follow their decision. 
99 
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Thomas J, on the other hand, focused on what he referred to as "the fundamental 
administrative law value" of equal treatment to persons or entities in the same situation. 
Here, Pharrnac was interfering in the operation of the market. He was able to draw upon 
the clear undertaking by Pharmac to afford "equality of treatment" on the level of subsidy 
for pharmaceuticals used to treat the same or similar conditions and which produced the 
same or similar effects. He saw Pharmac as wanting to step outside its extensive 
published procedures, arrived at after extensive consultation, and act contrary to the way 
the particular pharmaceuticals had historically been treated. He indicated that Pharrnac 
had not "reserved for itself the power to act arbitrarily as between suppliers, even though 
it might be able to claim that any such action would best suit the health needs of the 
population" I0 1• He agreed with the High Court decision that limited time, resources and 
significant savings would not justify unevenhanded treatment in the circumstances. 
The majority's focus was more pragmatic. 102 
Phannac is a relatively small organisation. Its funding is limited. So is the pool of expertise within 
this country. An evaluation of candidates for a possible sub-group is al so not done as an isolated 
exercise. There are numerous available drugs in multiple groups or sub-groups. The same 
problem for need for evaluation or re-evaluation will doubtless be encountered simultaneously in 
several areas of Pharmac's oversight. It cannot realistically be expected to attend to everything at 
once. Therefore, it has to prioritise both as between categories of drugs and within those 
categories. It is also not entirely without significance that a substantial amount of Pharmac's money 
and of the time of Pharmac staff is being taken up in the conduct of complex litigation brought 
against it by drug companies. That must reduce its capacity to conduct reviews of pharmaceuticals. 
For these reasons it cannot be said to be improper for Pharmac, in appropriate circumstances, to 
undertake a classification or reclassification exercise progressively ... If they did, a decision might 
be delayed perhaps for several years and Pharmac's function under the Act would be frustrated in 
the meantime. 
The Privy Council upheld the majority view. 103 After discussing the findings of the High 
Court and minority appellate Judge that the "lack of evenhandedness and consistency on 
Pharrnac's part . . . not dissimilar in kind to the grounds which have led the Courts to 
intervene elsewhere in the interests of securing procedural fairness" and the evidence on 
the point, their Lordships concluded that Pharrnac had reasonably formed the view that 
the therapeutic effect of Rulide was "the same as or similar to the therapeutic effect of the 
erythromycins". Therefore, the only issue could be one of timing'0' : 
IO I 
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103 
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Their Lordships accept that if Rousell could show that Pharmac were obliged under their OPP to 
review Rulide and Klacid together, or if the failure to do so was contrary to some overriding 
principle of fairness, requiring equals to be treated equally, then there might be gorunds for 
attacking Pharmac's decision to review one before the other. Can any such case be made out? 
On the first point, the Law Lords found nothing in the OPP to indicate or require that 
reference pricing could only take effect after the review of all the various medicines in the 
group or sub-group had taken place, separately or together. On the second, the Law Lords 
did not appear to see the "unfairness" argument as a justiciable process ground: 105 
Their Lordships would give the same answer to the wider argument that it was "unfair" to reduce 
the subsidy on Rulide without also reducing the subsidy on Klacid ... Their Lordships are by no 
means persuaded that the unfairness of which Rousell now complains is a procedural unfairness of 
the kind which justifies the Court's intervention by way of judicial review. What is attacked is the 
decision to review the macrolides one by one, not the way of arriving at that decision. But putting 
that on one side, fairness does not require all potential candidates for a sub-group to be reviewed at 
the same time. New candidates might be introduced in the course of a review, with the result that 
Pharmac's task might never be done ... There were sound economic reasons for pressing on with 
the review of Rulide, and for implementing the decision as soon as it was made ... The cost of 
subsidising Rulide represented a very large part of the total cost of subsidising the macrolides. fn 
comparison the cost of subsidising Klacid was tiny. Fairness to Rousell had to be judged at the 
time the decision was made, and balanced against the public interest in reducing expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals. 
So in the end we see that the Law Lords examined the substantive fairness of the decision 
to treat Rulide spearately from Klacid. The balancing of interests was not judged to 
favour Rousell. 
The minority judgment in the Court of Appeal focused on the equivalent position of 
Rulide and Klacid in the same therapeutic sub-group, receiving the same subsidy. 
Thomas J was not persuaded by the difference in market share or the different marketing 
strategy which was at the heart of Pharmac's decision. Subsequent to Pharmac's decision, 
Klacid reduced its price significantly. Accordingly, the review of its position was 
afforded greater urgency by Pharmac. Thomas J wryly observed that the "consequences 
of acting inconsistently are now more apparent" 106 • 
We know from the judgments that there was extensive consultation between Pharmac and 
Rousell over the two year period that Rulide was under review. We do not know whether 
the risk of different marketplace behaviour on the part of the manufacturers of Klacid 
105 
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were arguments made by Rousell and put to Pharmac or, if they were, what Pharmac 
made of them. 
I wonder about the cost-effectiveness of the process preferred by Thomas J. Would it 
unnecessarily or unacceptably slow down decision-making so that the public could not 
take the benefit of progressive decisions, as found by the majority, or would it protect 
Rulide's positions in service of a greater public interest, and prevent unnecessary market 
distortions and hurried remedial activity, as suggested by Thomas J? 
To speak of a duty of equal treatment to persons in like situations as a "fundamental 
administrative law value" might seem uncontentious. However such concepts, divorced 
from some express acceptance on the part of the decision-maker, seem somewhat illusory. 
Thomas J's analysis of Pharmac's obligations was primarily based on his view of 
Pharmac's expressed policies. Should administrative law values go so far, for example, 
as to find the fisheries cost recovery regime to be unlawful ( assuming for a moment it is 
not the subject of legislative implementation) because other primary production sectors 
are not subject to a similar regime? I suggest that today's governmental processes, which 
have lead the Minister to the point where he considers that inconsistent treatment to be 
unfair and will promote policies to address the issues/ 07 provide a more democratically 
acceptable path to the same end point. 
D Survey of Ministers/Chief Executives 
Appendix A contains the responses to a questionnaire to Ministers and Chief Executives. 
The questionnaire itself is Appendix B. 
While the survey group (Appendix C) is necessarily a very small one and one cannot draw 
too many conclusions from it, it does raise some interesting points. There is a broad 
difference in perception of what proportion of decisions made are capable of judicial 
review (question 1). For Ministers, at least, the actual threat of judicial review generally 
has no influence on the decision-making process. As one Minister indicated, decision-
makers will be trying to make reasonable decisions notwithstanding judicial oversight. 
Chief Executives, however, who will generally carry the burden of ensuring the Minister 
107 Media release, Minister of Fisheries, 30 September 1998 
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is properly advised, responded more positively to the influence of the threat of review to 
the process ( question 2). 
Advice on the legal parameters of decision-making powers appeared to be received pretty 
much as a matter of course (interestingly Chief Executives saw themselves giving more 
advice than the Ministers saw themselves receiving!) (question 3). The question 
specifically referred to the relevance of international conventions and the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi. The relevance of these matters are, of course, now built into the 
decision-making process through the procedures set out in the Cabinet Office Manual. 
The advice received was universally seen as generally enhancing the decision-making 
process, although, as one Minister observed, "it also limits options". The recent 
announcement of the Minister of Fisheries in relation to costs recovery is an example of 
this 108 (question 4). 
Question 5 indicated a difference in perceptions between Ministers and Chief Executives 
as to the frequency of advice received on proper procedures to be followed in decision-
making. One Minister observed that "in some areas consultation has gone mad!", while 
one Chief Executive observed that "proper procedures . . . seldom if ever require 
consultation (when exercising a statutory power)". One presumes that this respondent is 
fairly drawing a distinction between consultation and the procedural requirements of the 
duty to act fairly when exercising a statutory power. Consultation is seen as influential in 
the decision-making process ( question 6). Views varied, but generally Ministers 
perceived consultation to be an effective use of government resources whereas Chief 
Executives tended to be less enthusiastic. Ministers noted that it provided an "added cost 
and further hurdle" limiting policy change. Another noted the weakness of receiving a 
"vested interest" response rather than general public interest. ( question 7) 
Question 8 saw the costs of participation by interested persons and groups in the decision-
making process as generally an effective use of their resources. One comment 
acknowledged the educative effect of the process. Another referred to inappropriately 
high expectations. Generally, the effectiveness of Ministerial decision-making was not 
seen to be inhibited by the requirements of administrative law (question 9). Neither was 
108 Above n 85 
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there unanimous enthusiasm for the proposition that the effectiveness was enhanced by 
the same requirements ( question 10). 
The views of Ministers was spread across the spectrum m answer to whether they 
considered the overall cost to society of complying with the requirements of 
administrative law to be a reasonable charge in promoting good public administration 
( question 11 ). The comments of Ministers indicated significant reservations. 
Interestingly, when asked to compare the relative influences of checks on Ministerial 
powers by judicial review, complaint to the Ombudsman, investigation by a Select 
Committee, opposition question in the House and an item on the "Holmes" show, judicial 
review seemed to attract a relatively high level of influence. However, as one Minister 
observed "the fact that a Minister is publicly accountable is an important discipline by 
. whatever means". 
VI CONCLUSION 
Is judicial review promoting good administration? 
On the date this paper is due for submission it is expected that the Governor-General will 
sign into law the Ngai Tahu Treaty of Waitangi Claims Settlement Act 1998, the third of 
the significant Treaty Claims Settlements. 
Included in that settlement is land which was "memoralised" as a result of the 1987 SOE 
Lands case. '09 It is not difficult to argue that judicial review has had an impact on the 
substance of government decision making and policy. As the Minister in Charge of 
Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations has observed 11°: 
109 
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We have an unwritten and evolving constitution. This, combined with the evolving nature of the 
Treaty relationship itself, leaves us with some flexibility to respond to the constitutional position 
of Maori . Gradually, and in fragments , steps of constitutional significance have been taken - the 
Waitangi Tribunal's jurisdiction has been extended, obligations to consult have developed in 
various policy areas, and . . . Treaty principles have been expressed and incorporated into 
legislation. In these senses, the Treaty - or at least some intangible notion of its spirit - has at 
some undefined point become part of our evolving constitution. 
Perhaps one can see in his words the concept of a different partnership - one between the 
Courts and government. Respectful of and responsive to reach others position and role, 
much can and has been achieved. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Appendix A summarises the results of questionnaires sent to the 11 current Cabinet 
ministers who have (almost) five or more years Cabinet experience, and to 14 chief 
executives of core government departments. Recipients were advised in a covering letter 
that: 
The objective is simply to obtain a range of subjective responses from those most significantly 
affected by judicial review. 
Responses were received from seven of the 11 ministers, and from six of the 14 chief 
executives. 
The ministers who responded have a total of 59 years Cabinet experience between them. 
AppendixB 
A copy of the questionnaire sent to Ministers is Appendix B. A similar questionnaire was 
sent to chief executives, but with questions altered to ensure the focus was on advice to 
ministers and ministerial (as opposed to departmental) decision-making. 
Appendix C 
A list of recipients is Appendix C. 
APPENDIX A 
Question 1: 
Of the decisions you make as Minister, about what proportion do you 
perceive to be capable of judicial review by the Courts? [Please disregard the 
actual likelihood of review.] 
Question one 
2 
none 
Comments: 
Ministers 
3 4 5 
all 
OCEO 
•Minister 
1 Economic and fiscal decisions generally out of reach of the Court. Ownership and 
Treaty decisions capable of review. 
2 Most health decisions are delegated to HF A, HHS where all are subject to judicial 
review. 
CEOs 
Answer relates to decisions when a statutory power is exercised - very limited in 
numbers and scope. 
Question 2: 
Does the actual threat of review influence your decision-makin ,g process? 
Question two 
4 
3 
2 
0 
1 
not at all 
Comments: 
Ministers 
2 3 4 5 
definately 
OCEO 
BI Minister 
1 I try to meet tests of reasonableness in decisions in any event. 
CEOs 
1 Care is taken to ensure that the record shows the Minister considers each matter on its 
merits and has all the necessary information before him. 
Question 3: 
Do you receive advice on the legal parameters of your powers? [This will 
include such matters as whether you are required, for example, to take into 
account matters such as certain international conventio: ns and Treaty of 
Waitangi principles.] 
Question three 
2 3 
never 
Comments: 
Ministers 
4 5 
always 
OCEO 
II Minister 
1 In areas likely to be reviewed such as fisheries very full legal parameters are 
supplied. 
2 Where they may be reviewable. 
3 Where appropriate, yes. 
CEOs 
1 Applies to the very limited circumstances in which the Minister holds the statutory 
authority. 
Question 4: 
Do you consider that advice to enhance your decision-making? 
Question four 
OCEO 
Iii Minister 
2 3 4 5 
never always 
Comments: 
Ministers 
1 It probably does, it also limits options. 
Question 5: 
Do you receive advice on the proper procedures to be followed, including the 
need for and requirements of consultation? 
Question five 
4 
3 
2 
0 -I----~--
2 3 4 5 
never always 
Comments: 
Ministers 
1 Generally yes. In some areas consultation has gone mad! 
2 Where appropriate, always. 
OCEO 
DM inister 
3 This is generally delegated - HF A, HHS always get advice on this, especially HF A. 
CEOs 
1 Advice on proper procedures - yes, but this seldom if ever requires consultation 
(when exercising a statutory power). 
Question 6: 
Is the consultation carried out by you or on your behalf influential in your 
decision-making? 
Question six 
OCEO 
1111 Minister 
2 3 4 5 
never always 
Comments: 
Ministers 
1 Both can have an influence but not always. 
2 It is, although I do not always follow recommendation from consultations. 
CEOs 
1 No consultation is normally required. 
Question 7: 
Do you perceive the consultation carried out by you or on your behalf to be 
an effective use of government resources? 
Question seven 
2 3 
never 
Comments: 
Ministers 
4 5 
always 
OCEO 
•Minister 
1 Often it is an added cost and further hurdle limiting policy change. 
2 Generally, yes. The weakness is that one often gets a "vested interest" response rather 
than general public interest. 
CEOs 
1 No consultation is normally required. 
Question 8: 
Do you consider the costs of participation by interested persons and groups in 
the decision-making process to be an effective use of their resources? 
Question eight 
2 3 
never 
Comments: 
Ministers 
4 5 
always 
DCEO 
Iii Minister 
1 Sometimes their expectations of consultation are well in excess of the outcome. They 
generally wish to change policy to protect privilege or rights. 
2 It can be. 
3 Often educative for both sides even if decisions go ahead. 
CEOs 
1 No participation is normally required. 
Question 9: 
Do you perceive your effectiveness to be inhibited by the requirements of 
administrative law to act "reasonably, fairly and in accordance with the 
law"? 
Question nine 
4 
3 
2 
0 
2 
not at all 
Comments: 
Ministers 
3 4 5 
definately 
1 Not greatly, just slowed down and more expensive. 
DCEO 
Ill Minister 
Question 10: 
Do you perceive your effectiveness to be enhanced by the requirements of 
administrative law to act "reasonably, fairly and in accordance with the 
law"? 
Question ten 
4 
3 
2 
0 
2 
not at all 
Comments: 
Ministers 
1 Generally little change. 
3 4 5 
definately 
OCEO 
Ill Minister 
Question 11: 
Do you consider the overall costs to society of complying with the 
requirements of administrative law to be a reasonable charge in promoting 
good public administration? 
Question eleven 
4 
3 
2 
0CEO 
Ii Minister 
0 
2 3 4 5 
little value significant value 
Comments: 
Ministers 
1 Generally increases costs but probably necessary in moderation. 
2 I doubt whether the threat of review improves the public policy process much if at all. 
Any costs involved therefore are of doubtful value. 
3 Only moderate due to the propensity to attract "vested" interests and activists - the 
silent majority are not often heard. 
4 High costs can be incurred totally disproportionate to outcome. 
Question 12: 
How would you describe the relative influence of the following democratic 
checks and balances on decision-making processes: 
(a) Judicial review of the decision by the High Court. 
Question twelve ( a): Judicial review 
4 
3 
OCEO 
2 1:1 Minister 
0 
2 3 4 5 
little influence significant influence 
Comments: 
Ministers 
1 Must follow letter of law even if not the intent. Less ability to exercise judgement. 
2 It's there but I try to meet the tests anyway. 
3 Too much influence. 
Question 12 (continued) 
(b) Complaint to the Ombudsman. 
Question twelve (b ): ombudsman 
4 
3 
2 
0 
Comments: 
Ministers 
2 3 
little influence 
4 5 
0CEO 
&!Minister 
significant influence 
1 Generally of little relevance as I try to meet requests of public. 
2 Quality marginal from this source. Rather strictly "bureaucratic" type decisions. Not 
very helpful. 
Question 12 (continued) 
(c) Investigation by Select Committee. 
Question twelve ( c ): Select Committee 
4 
3 
2 
0 
Comments: 
Ministers 
2 3 
little influence 
4 5 
OCEO 
lil!Minister 
significant influence 
1 Generally controlled by Government but may change in future. 
2 [Scored 3] Owing to their relative incompetence. 
3 Near irrelevant. 
Question 12 (continued) 
( d) Opposition question in the House. 
Question twelve ( d): PQ 
4 
3 
2 
0 
2 3 4 5 
OCEO 
iilM inister 
little influence significant influence 
Comments: 
Ministers 
1 I enjoy questions on any area of responsibility . 
2 Usually low grade political point scoring. 
Question 12 (continued) 
(e) "Holmes" Show item. 
Question twelve ( e ): Holmes show 
4 
3 
2 
DCEO 
Ill Minister 
0 
2 3 4 5 
little influence significant influence 
Comments: 
Ministers 
1 Only interested in conflict or to embarrass Ministers or Government. 
2 Does not change the decision - makes it necessary to find very simplistic 
explanations. 
Question 12 (continued) 
(f) Other? 
Comments: 
Ministers 
1 An occasional journalist can probe an issue. 
2 The fact that a Minister is publicly accountable is an important discipline by whatever 
means. All the above processes are a part of the public accountability. 
3 The judgement of one ' s peers in the marketplace. 
APPENDIX B 
LAWS 519 : QUESTIONNAIRE TO MINISTERS 
Definition: 
Judicial review is the process of review by the High Court, on the application of an 
affected person or body, of the lawfulness, fairness and/or reasonableness of decisions 
made in the public sphere and which adversely affect the interests of individuals. Judicial 
review is perceived as a constitutional safeguard whereby the Courts exercise a 
supervisory jurisdiction to protect the citizen against the abuse of public power. 
Please circle your answers on the scale of 1-5 
1. Of the decisions you make as Minister, about what proportion do you perceive to 
be capable of judicial review by the Courts? [Please disregard the actual 
likelihood of review.] 
1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
All 
Any comment:----------------- ---- ----
2. Does the actual threat of review influence your decision-making process? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Definitely 
Any comment:-------------------------
3. Do you receive advice on the legal parameters of your powers? [This will include 
such matters as whether you are required, for example, to take into account 
matters such as certain international conventions and Treaty of W aitangi 
principles.] 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Always 
Any comment:-------------------------
4. Do you consider that advice to enhance your decision-making? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Always 
Any comment: --------------------------
5. Do you receive advice on the proper procedures to be followed, including the need 
for and requirements of consultation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Always 
Any comment: --------------------------
6. Is the consultation carried out by you or on your behalf influential in your 
decision-making? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Always 
Any comment:--------------------------
7. Do you consider the consultation carried out by you or on your behalf to be an 
effective use of government resources? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Always 
Any comment:--------------------------
8. Do you consider the costs of participation by interested persons and groups in the 
decision-making process to be an effective use of their resources? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Always 
Any comment:--------------------------
9. Do you perceive your effectiveness to be inhibited by the requirements of 
administrative law to act "reasonably, fairly and in accordance with the law"? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Definitely 
Any comment: --------------------------
10. Do you perceive your effectiveness to be enhanced by the requirements of 
administrative law to act "reasonably, fairly and in accordance with the law"? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all Definitely 
Any comment: ________________________ _ 
11. Do you consider the overall costs to society of complying with the requirements of 
administrative law to be a reasonable charge in promoting good public 
administration? 
1 2 
Little value 
for money 
3 4 5 
Significant value 
for money 
Any comment:------------------------- -
12. How would you describe the relative influence of the following democratic checks 
and balances on your decision-making processes: 
(a) Judicial review of the decision by the High Court. 
1 
Little 
influence 
2 3 4 5 
Significant 
influence 
Any comment:-----------------------
(b) Complaint to the Ombudsman. 
1 
Little 
influence 
2 3 4 5 
Significant 
influence 
Any comment: -----------------------
( c) Investigation by Select Committee. 
1 
Little 
influence 
2 3 4 5 
Significant 
influence 
Any comment: ------------------------
( d) Opposition question in the House. 
1 
Little 
influence 
2 3 4 5 
Significant 
influence 
Any comment: _______________________ _ 
( e) "Holmes" Show item. 
1 
Little 
influence 
2 3 4 5 
Significant 
influence 
Any comment:-----------------------
(f) Other? _____________________ _
 
Any further 
Comment:-------------------------
------
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